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Abstract 
Connected car services are rapidly diffusing as 
they promise to significantly enhance the overall driv-
ing experience. Because they rely on the collection and 
exploitation of car data, however, such services are 
associated with significant privacy risks. Following 
guidelines on contextualized theorizing, this paper ex-
amines how individuals perceive these risks and how 
their privacy risk perceptions in turn influence their 
decision-making, i.e., their willingness to share car 
data with the car manufacturer or other service pro-
viders. We conducted a multi-method study, including 
interviews and a survey in Germany. We found that in-
dividuals’ level of perceived privacy risk is determined 
by their evaluation of the general likelihood of IS-spe-
cific threats and the belief of personal exposure to 
such threats. Two cognitive factors, need for cognition 
and institutional trust, are found to moderate the effect 
that perceived privacy risk has on individuals’ willing-
ness to share car data in exchange for connected car 
services. 
 
1. Introduction  
Connected car services promise to significantly 
enhance the driving experience. Smart parking ser-
vices help to easily find and book vacant parking spots, 
telematic insurance tariffs grant discounts for cautious 
driving and real-time feedback on one’s own driving 
style enhances eco-friendly driving. However, con-
nected car services crucially rely on processing the 
data that vehicles’ on-board sensors and GPS modules 
generate (such as vehicle position, acceleration and 
breaking data, radar data). Since such car data allow 
for various inferences about drivers, the collection, 
storage and processing of such digital exhaust has im-
plications for individuals’ privacy, meaning the con-
trol an individual has over information about oneself 
[32, 40]. Connected cars can hence be considered as 
privacy-invasive information systems (IS) [12]. Estab-
lished privacy-calculus models suggest that individu-
als weigh risks against benefits when deciding about 
whether they want to adopt such IS and share personal 
data with other parties [38]. However, the process of 
how individuals actually evaluate relevant contextual 
factors in forming their risk perceptions has only re-
ceived very little attention from privacy scholars. It is 
hence not well understood how individuals – con-
fronted with a distinctive privacy-invasive IS and its 
specifics like technical features, usage context, in-
volved stakeholders, etc. – form privacy risk percep-
tions and ho w they anticipate these in their decision-
making. 
Addressing this research gap appears particularly 
timely, as the wave of novel privacy-invasive IS, 
namely Internet of Things (IoT) devices or smart prod-
ucts, is already reaching virtually all areas of private 
and professional life [29]. The associated privacy risks 
that such products entail are expected to be more pro-
found and far-reaching than what consumers had to 
deal with in extant technological contexts. The con-
nected car in particular is associated with a large vari-
ety of privacy risks, which can even take the form of 
“life-threatening” breaches, like hacking attacks that 
deactivate a cars' braking system [29]. In response to 
this clear need for research, this paper sheds light on 
the formation and behavioral consequences of privacy 
risks in the context of connected cars. Only when the 
formation of privacy risks is understood as a highly 
context-specific, multifaceted assessment, scholars 
and service providers will be able to better understand 
customers' data sharing decisions and identify oppor-
tunities for service improvement [26]. Given the nov-
elty of our study context, we adopted a context-sensi-
tive approach in our theorizing [24]. With the goal to 
generate insights of high practical relevance, this ap-
proach suggests paying close attention to characteris-
tics of the IS artifact as well as to its usage context and 
integrate these in the process of theorizing.  
The anticipation of privacy risks has frequently 
been shown to reduce individuals’ intention to share 
personal data [27, 28, 42]. While privacy is being de-
fined as a highly context-sensitive concept, common 
measurements of how its loss is perceived by individ-
uals are pictured as abstract and unidimensional [25]. 







Privacy risks and privacy concerns as the most com-
mon conceptualizations in this regard [38], usually ne-
glect the specific manifestations of privacy risks in the 
respective context. This shortcoming limits the contri-
bution extant quantitative examinations have in ex-
plaining the formation and consequences of privacy 
risks [25]. 
Different IS will be more or less likely to cause 
specific negative consequences that are related to the 
loss of control over the collection and use of personal 
data. Such negative consequences depend not only on 
the technical features of an IS, but also other aspects 
such as users' degrees of freedom in deciding which 
information to disclose, the involved stakeholders and 
the legal safeguards in place. These determinants for 
privacy risk will be different for connected cars than, 
for instance, in the context of social media applications 
[28]: In the context of connected cars, social conse-
quences might be less likely, as the spectrum of deli-
cate private information is more limited compared to 
social networks and as it seems improbable that car 
manufacturers have an interest in exposing their cus-
tomers, for instance, as poor drivers. On the other 
hand, users of connected cars might be more alarmed 
of physical consequences, as hackers could manipulate 
vehicle functions to harm their targets [29]. 
Our work extends prior literature in at least three 
ways. First, we conduct rigorously contextualized re-
search in the novel and highly relevant context of con-
nected cars. Second, we provide an integrative per-
spective on privacy risk perceptions as an individual's 
assessment of two components: Perceptions of IS-spe-
cific threats that might occur to users of the IS in gen-
eral and their perceived level of personal exposure to 
such threats. Third, we conduct a context-specific in-
vestigation of the cognitive factors influencing the role 
of privacy risk perceptions in the data sharing deci-
sion. We conduct our empirical work in two phases: 
First, we develop a robust measure for perceived con-
nected car threats in seven dimensions (physical, so-
cial, resource-related, psychological, prosecution-re-
lated, career-related and freedom-related risks; [25]) 
and identify further contextual factors of relevance. 
We draw on the rich data from 33 context-immersive 
interviews we conducted with car drivers. Second, we 
then test our hypotheses around the formation and be-
havioral consequences of privacy risk perceptions, 
based on data collected through a large-scale online 
survey among car drivers (n = 791).  
2. Conceptual Background 
Risk perceptions are assumed a key determinant 
of consumers' decision making [15]. In general, risk is 
commonly constructed of two elements: The severity 
of negative consequences and the likelihood of their 
occurrence [14]. As risk can hardly be captured objec-
tively, empirical studies predominantly rely on per-
ceived risk, as consumers personal belief regarding 
risks based on the information available to them [15]. 
Services that require individuals to disclose per-
sonal information pose potential threats to the user's 
information privacy. Negative consequences can arise 
through the loss of control over personal data [30]. 
Two basic constructs have emerged to measure nega-
tive consequences associated with data sharing (pri-
vacy concerns and privacy risks), which are most com-
monly used in one of their many variations in research 
on privacy [38]. 
Established measurements of privacy concerns 
focus on individuals' concerns of how organizations 
handle their data [26]. The CFIP scale, for instance, 
captures individuals' concerns that privacy-invasive 
practices (collection, errors in processing as well as 
unauthorized access or unintended use of personal 
data) affect them negatively. These concerns entail an 
emotional, normative notion, as they reflect what 
"bothers" an individual and what "companies should" 
do when handling personal data [39]. Privacy concerns 
thereby serve as a proxy for privacy itself [2] and are 
often considered as individuals dispositional belief re-
garding privacy, referring to their tendency to worry 
about information privacy that is rather consistent 
across different contexts [30]. 
In parallel, conceptualizations of privacy risk 
have emerged in literature. In contrast to privacy con-
cerns, they try to capture an individual's expectations 
of the consequences of privacy-invasive practices for 
them. Two categories of conceptualizations can be 
identified: While several studies define privacy risks 
as an individual's expectations of other parties behav-
ing opportunistically as they receive access to personal 
information [44] others conceptualize privacy risks as 
an individual's expectations of potential disadvantages 
associated with data disclosure [13, 30, 38]. Opposed 
to privacy concerns as a more trait-like construct [2], 
several studies have considered privacy risks a more 
situation-specific assessment that can override dispo-
sitional attitudes [30]. 
In literature, this distinction of the prevalent con-
cepts privacy concerns and privacy risks is often 
blurred and their positioning in research models is am-
biguous: Many studies use the terms synonymously 
[5]. More broadly, privacy is often seen as an end in 
itself rather than a means to avoid negative conse-
quences associated with collection and misuse of data 
in a specific context. What is more, both privacy risks 
and privacy concerns are often measured as an indi-




adverse to their privacy, without capturing why a po-
tential limitation of privacy is perceived risky. In other 
words, these conceptualizations remain "unidimen-
sional and fairly abstract" [25], as they assume that in-
dividuals feel negatively impacted by restrictions to 
privacy, but remain unclear, by which exact conse-
quences of privacy-invasive practices they are – or ex-
pect to be – affected. Calling for a context-specific and 
multidimensional investigation of privacy risks, Kar-
watzki et al. [25] propose to consider seven dimen-
sions of risks (physical, social, resource-related, psy-
chological, prosecution-related, career-related and 
freedom-related risks) caused by privacy-invasive 
practices. 
Several studies have outlined specific negative 
consequences of different privacy-invasive IS: Unin-
tended use of customer information in direct market-
ing can entail psychological risks, as it violates the 
consumer's basic need for fairness [10]. In ride-hailing 
services like "Uber", information on speed and loca-
tion may be used to penalize drivers if they do not fol-
low the app's instructions [32], reflecting career-re-
lated risks. In online social networks, personal infor-
mation shared can be exploited through commercial 
agents, be used by employers to generate insights on 
prospective employees, or even be abused by stalkers 
[28], reflecting financial, career- and freedom-related 
risks. Information collected through smart health 
trackers may result in financial and social risks for us-
ers [26], if, for instance, their unhealthy habits are re-
vealed and health insurances shift them to more expen-
sive tariffs. These examples underline that the nega-
tive consequences arising from other parties' access to 
individuals' personal data are highly context-specific, 
as the likelihood of the different dimensions will vary 
for different IS.  
As individuals build personal perceptions of risk 
inherent to a transaction based on the information 
available to them [33], we propose to investigate per-
ceived privacy risk as an assessment of two compo-
nents: The general likelihood of negative conse-
quences specific to a privacy-invasive IS – in our case, 
potential connected car threats they perceive – and 
their personal exposure to these threats, reflecting the 
severity of negative consequences.  
3. Hypotheses 
3.1. The formation of privacy risk perceptions 
based on perceived connected car threats and 
chronic prevention focus 
As widely tested and established in literature, we 
expect individuals to be less willing to share car data 
in exchange for a connected car service if perceived 
privacy risks are high. Hence, we propose the follow-
ing baseline hypothesis: 
H0: Perceived privacy risk will be negatively as-
sociated with intention to share data. 
We expect perceived privacy risk to be a function 
of the specific negative outcomes of data sharing that 
individuals anticipate in a specific IS context [26]. As 
individuals decide whether to share car data in ex-
change for a connected car service, they will evaluate 
the likelihood of negative consequences, as well as the 
form that those negative consequences could take, in 
relation to factors like physical safety, social status, 
and freedom [25]. While the dimensions affected by 
privacy invasion may be similar to other contexts, the 
exact manifestations of negative consequences and 
their likelihood of occurrence will be distinctive for 
connected cars, given their specifics such as technical 
features, data types, usage context, involved stake-
holders, and so on. In particular, we see three main 
reasons, why the context of connected cars as an IoT 
application may differ a lot from extant technology 
contexts privacy has been investigated in: Connected 
cars (1) generate data of unparalleled amount and 
specificity, (2) permeate both the virtual and the phys-
ical space, and, (3) reflect an IS context highly regu-
lated and characterized by a broad range of different 
situations and implications of usage. 
It was found [9] that individuals associate con-
crete negative consequences with connected cars – 
such as unwanted use of data for commercials by car 
manufacturers, feelings of surveillance, and disad-
vantages in the settlement of accident claims with car 
rentals or insurers when their car data was analyzed – 
and found that these were reasons why potential users 
were reluctant to share their driving data. We expect 
that the more strongly individuals believe that negative 
outcomes may arise from access to users' personal data 
[25] (here: from connected cars), the more they worry 
that a loss will result from their sharing of such data 
[30]. Thus: 
H1: Perceived connected car threats will be pos-
itively associated with perceived privacy risk. 
While perceived connected car threats reflect the per-
ceived nature of privacy risks in our context, we argue 
that an individual's chronic prevention focus reflects 
the perceived personal exposure to contextual privacy 
risks. Compared to other privacy-invasive IS, the con-
text of connected cars is characterized by a dense net-
work of rules. For instance, whereas users of 
smartphones are relatively unconstrained in their ac-
tivities, car drivers need to comply with traffic regula-
tions such as speed limits, as well as with the manu-
facturer’s maintenance instructions if they want to 




drivers comply with relevant rules is structurally dif-
ferent across individuals, as regulatory focus theory 
postulates [19]: Individuals assess choices based on 
potential gains and losses, as well as based on potential 
“nongains” and “nonlosses,” meaning the absence of 
positive and negative outcomes. Individuals can be 
characterized by their chronic regulatory focus, i.e., 
their general tendency to be more or less promotion- 
or prevention focused [23]. Individuals that are gener-
ally at the promotion-focused end of the spectrum are 
eager to maximize gains and are more willing to accept 
risky situations to avoid nongains, i.e., missing out on 
advantages. At the other end, chronically prevention-
focused individuals are highly vigilant and try to be-
have safely to minimize negative outcomes [7]. In 
other words, individuals with a high prevention focus 
are often found to have a lower propensity to risk 
losses [17] and are more willing to forego opportuni-
ties, i.e., to accept nongains. Correspondingly, if was 
found [19] that prevention-focused individuals are less 
likely to engage in rule-breaking driving behavior such 
as speeding. Put differently, driving safely and stick-
ing to the rules helps prevention-focused drivers to ful-
fill their desire to avoid losses. While these drivers 
may lose out on travel speed and driving pleasure, i.e., 
experience nongains, they are content to do so in order 
to reduce the possibility of accidents as well as finan-
cial and legal problems. Building on this point, we ar-
gue that an individual’s chronic position on the spec-
trum between prevention focus and promotion focus is 
determinant to that individual’s perceived privacy risk 
in the context of connected cars. The connected car, 
constantly collecting and transmitting driving data, 
may provide car manufacturers, service providers, or 
even law enforcement authorities with unprecedented 
means to track compliance with rules, and, in turn, to 
detect rule-breaking. The degree to which drivers con-
sider negative consequences from sharing car data as 
severe should thus be affected by their level of preven-
tion focus. As car drivers with high prevention focus 
are more likely to obey traffic rules and maintenance 
instructions, they might view the disclosure of their 
driving style and car handling as less threating than 
less prevention-focused drivers, who are more likely 
to engage in traffic offenses such as speeding or to 
treat their car carelessly. Hence, we propose: 
H2: Chronic prevention focus will be negatively 
associated with perceived privacy risk. 
2.2. The moderating role of need for cognition 
and institutional trust 
We further expect the negative association be-
tween perceived privacy risk and intention to share car 
data to be moderated by two cognitive factors, need for 
cognition and institutional trust. 
Previous research [27] has investigated the im-
pact of different thinking styles on individuals' privacy 
risk perceptions and data sharing decisions. Thinking 
styles describe individual preferences for either expe-
riential thinking or rational thinking, which guide the 
deliberation and depth of information processing [37]. 
Individuals with a high need for cognition prefer ra-
tional thinking, associated with a more thorough and 
intensive processing of information compared to indi-
viduals with a high faith into intuition, reflecting a 
preference for experiential thinking [16]. For instance, 
individuals with a high need for cognition were found 
to perform better at analytical tasks and to show a 
higher need for security and conformity [36]. In pri-
vacy research [27], evidence was found that individu-
als with a high need for cognition perceive higher pri-
vacy risks due to a more thorough assessment. Build-
ing on these findings, but embedding the construct in 
a contextualized research model, we consider need for 
cognition as a moderator of privacy risk perceptions 
rather than an antecedent. As the consideration of pri-
vacy risks is a complex task, it is plausible to expect 
that individuals high in need for cognition more 
strongly rely on their privacy risk perceptions and are 
less likely to let their disclosure decisions be diluted 
by more superficial aspects such as heuristics and bi-
ases. We expect drivers with a high need for cognition 
to attach more weight to their perceptions of privacy 
risk when performing the privacy calculus in the deci-
sion whether to share data in exchange for a connected 
car service. Hence, we propose: 
H3: The association between perceived privacy 
risk and intention to share data will be moderated by 
need for cognition; this means, if need for cognition is 
high, the negative effect of perceived privacy risk on 
intention to share car data will be higher as well. 
On the other hand, several studies have found ev-
idence for trust as a factor mitigating the effect of per-
ceived privacy risks in the privacy calculus [4, 30]. In 
privacy research, trust is considered a belief positively 
influencing an individual's willingness to share per-
sonal data, as it embodies the expectation that another 
actor will not behave opportunistically [38]. The exact 
positioning of trust and its role in the privacy calculus 
have been inconsistent across extant privacy studies 
[38]. In the basic privacy calculus, trust is conceptual-
ized as a benefit dimension, impacting intentions to 
disclose data independently of the cost dimension [3]. 
We, however, argue that trust is rather affecting an in-
dividual's willingness to accept risk [41] than impact-
ing risk perceptions directly. Trust building has been 




crease user's willingness to use privacy-invasive ser-
vices [9], which is potentially more effective than re-
ducing perceived privacy risks per se [9] and more 
practical to address by service providers. While some 
work [9, 17] has investigated the impact of relational 
trust towards the data-requesting stakeholder on risk 
perceptions, we follow the stronger argumentation of 
several studies [27, 28] that measured institutional 
trust as a general tendency towards confidence in a 
data-collecting institution or medium [27]. We suggest 
that individuals, trying to reduce cognitive complexity 
of the data sharing decision, rely on this general ten-
dency towards a stakeholder group rather than to as-
sess the specific provider's relational trustworthiness. 
This should especially be the case in the novel context 
of connected cars: Several connected car services such 
as intelligent parking services rely on different manu-
facturers working together to arrive at a critical mass 
of users. If drivers assume that established car manu-
facturers have taken the respective measures to pre-
vent negative consequences for their customers, for in-
stance, through secure data transmission or anony-
mization, they will assign less weight to their privacy 
risk perceptions in the disclosure decision. We there-
fore formulate: 
H4: The association between perceived privacy 
risk and intention to share data will be moderated by 
institutional trust; this means, if institutional trust is 
high, the negative effect of perceived privacy risk on 
intention to disclose car data will be attenuated. 
 
Figure 1 shows our research model. 
 
Figure 1: Contextualized Research Model. 
  
4. Methods 
We conducted our empirical work in two phases: 
Before testing our hypotheses through a large-scale 
online survey, we conducted a qualitative pre-study 
(semi-structured interviews) We did so to further en-
hance contextualization of our research model, closely 
following respective guidelines [24]. As we contextu-
alized the established privacy calculus perspective 
through adding further core constructs (chronic pre-
vention focus and need for cognition; contextualiza-
tion level 1) and a contextual moderator (institutional 
trust towards car manufacturers; contextualization 
level 2b), the objectives of our pre-study have been the 
threefold: First, we wished to investigate whether the 
dimensions of privacy risk put forward [26] do hold in 
the IoT context and the connected car setting in partic-
ular. Second, we aimed to develop a robust measure 
for perceived connected car threats. Lastly, we sought 
to identify context-specific control variables (contex-
tualization level 2a, [24]) that might impact the inten-
tion to share car data. 
4.1. Pre-study: Developing and Enhancing the 
Contextualized Research Model 
Design and procedure. In our interview setting, 
we went beyond the mere hypothetical, scenario-based 
approach which is usually applied by privacy scholars 
[3, 26]. To enhance the validity of our qualitative ex-
amination, we placed participants on the driver’s seat 
of a connected car and interviewed them after show-
casing the connected car services. We recruited 33 car 
drivers in Germany (age: min = 19 years, max = 83 
years, M = 36.3 years, SD = 17.7; gender: M = 52% 
male; car usage: 49% frequent drivers). After a live 
demonstration of the connected car, we asked respond-
ents to elaborate on, for example, their attitude to-
wards connected cars, what they like and dislike about 
the demonstrated services, and their ideas on how to 
improve connected car functionalities and services.  
Data analysis. A detailed discussion of the data 
analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper and can 
be provided by the authors upon request. We con-
ducted a content analysis of the interview material to 
derive categories and subcategories of negative conse-
quences individuals associated with sharing car data. 
We compared our categories and subcategories to ex-
tant privacy research. Our categories corresponded 
well to the seven privacy risk dimensions proposed by 
Karwatzki et al. [25] whose multidimensional privacy 
risk scale was developed through consumer research. 
Furthermore, our subcategories closely matched the 
negative consequences associated with connected cars 
that Cichy [8] identified. We decided to adopt their 
categorizations to arrive at an integrated system of pri-
vacy risk dimensions and specific negative conse-
quences relevant in the connected car context. 
Findings. Table 1 presents the perceived con-
nected car threats reflected in our interviews. We 




put forward [26], namely psychological, social, free-
dom-related, prosecution-related, financial, career-re-
lated, and physical risks in our interview data as well. 
What is more, we were able to reproduce findings of 
[8] on the various connected car-specific threats even 
though our interview setting and design differed sig-
nificantly. This increases the confidence in the validity 
of our final set of connected car-specific threats that 
we use to create a measuring instrument. Collectively, 
our pre-study extends and integrates extant research in 
three ways: First, we line out exact, IS-specific threats 
that constitute the multiple dimensions of privacy 
risks. Second, we develop the first holistic categoriza-
tion linking perceived IS-specific threats with privacy 
risk dimensions and privacy-invasive practices, con-
tributing to a precise understanding of privacy risks. 
Third, we are able to validate the privacy risks dimen-
sions put forward [26] and the negative consequences 
associated with connected cars [8] identified in a more 
real-life investigation setting. Beyond perceived con-
nected car threats, the interviews indicated a number 
of contextual factors that might impact the intention to 
disclose car data, like driver's age, smartphone owner-
ship or mobility habits. Based on this, we derived sev-
eral covariates specific to the context of connected 
cars we included as control variables in our research 
model (see figure 1). 
 













Feelings of surveillance 
(in 14 of 33 interviews)  




Collection “But this is distracting, as I realized. You are permanently thinking: ‘Oh, OK, 
what do I need to do differently?’” (13.2) 
Physical Criminals identify vulnera-
bilities (8/33) 
Collection “Okay, this car is empty, or Mrs. XY is driving alone through the forest” (7.3) 
Manipulation of vehicle 




“What if the car starts honking on the motorway, because someone hacked my 
car. […] Suddenly, the […] doors open while you drive” (30.2) 
"Or they take over steering…like in […] action movies" (23.3) 
Social Stigmatization as poten-
tially poor driver (2/33) 
Collection "Other family members may be able to track my driving style […] My wife al-
ready complains about my driving style when we are in the car together, I 
don't need more of that" (31.5) 
Incorrect inferences from 
driving data (2/33) 
Errors "If they want to find something you did wrong, they will find it, no matter if 
any driver would have handled the car in the same way" (28.7) 
Finan-
cial 
Increased costs for car in-
surance (8/33) 
Secondary use “You will have to pay more for insurance, if you, for instance, drive 200 km/h 
on the motorway, even if it’s legal.” (22.1) 
Enforced repair jobs 
(4/33) 
Secondary use “They tell you: “You have to change brake pads, you have to do this and 
that” […] and the workshop does more than required” (14.5) 
Loss of warranty 
(2/33) 
Secondary use “Maybe I will be told that my driving style caused more wear and tear and 




Unsolicited ads (5/33) Secondary use “You will be bombarded with ads, as they know which shops you visit, etc.” 
(7.4) 
Use of data for un-intended 
purposes (5/33) 
Secondary use “I wouldn’t want that my data is sold to external providers, so they can adjust 
their sales activities” (8.5) 
Data leaks (3/33) Unauthorized 
access 
“The more companies possess my data, the more vulnerable is my data to 





of traffic offenses (3/33) 
Secondary use “I’d be concerned that someday all manufacturers are connected to the police 
[…] and you automatically receive tickets” (33.3) 
Optimization of radar con-
trol position (2/33) 
Secondary use “The police will know where people are speeding and will position their 




forming driving jobs (2/33) 
Secondary use “If somebody could see my driving data, like […] an employer, where I prob-
ably wouldn’t be able to defend myself, I would find that bad” (15.5) 
4.2. Main study: Testing the refined contextu-
alized research model 
Design and procedure. For our online survey, re-
spondents from Germany were recruited through invi-
tations via email, social media posts, and messenger 
services. As an incentive for participation, we offered 
tickets for a raffle of vouchers for an online retailer. 
The questionnaire consisted of three parts. We in-
troduced the respondents to the topic of connected 
cars. We asked respondents to imagine that their car 
was connected and that services were offered through 
its manufacturer. Then, participants were introduced 
to one of three randomly-assigned connected car ser-
vices (SmartParking, EcoDriver, Pay-how-you-drive 
Insurance). We relied on short descriptions and illus-
trations of the services as stimuli, visualizing their 
value propositions, their technical features, and the 
types of driving data required for usage. We then cap-
tured our constructs. For our final sample, we ex-
cluded participants who showed unreasonable comple-
tion times or failed an attention check as well as re-




sample size of 791 individuals, (min = 18; max = 69; 
SD = 12.51; female = 55%, mean age = 28 years, high 
school degree = 86%).  
Measurements. Figure 1 shows all main and con-
trol variables included. Perceived connected car 
threats were measured using the scale we developed as 
part of the qualitative pre-study. All other main varia-
bles were captured through established measures from 
extant studies, as both shown in the appendix. As our 
research relies on self-reported data, it is exposed to a 
potential common method bias [41]. We performed a 
confirmatory factor analysis and controlled for an un-
measured latent methods factor. Examining the struc-
tural parameters both with and without that factor in 
the model [34], we found only marginal differences 
(i.e., a maximum delta of 0.02 between estimates) and 
gained confidence in the robustness of our data. 
Findings. To test our hypotheses, we performed a 
multiple moderation regression analysis based on or-
dinary least squares path analysis [21] with heteroske-
dasticity-consistent standard errors (HC3; [22]). Col-
lectively, all hypotheses are supported: Perceived con-
nected car threats and chronic prevention focus are an-
tecedents of perceived privacy risk (positive, respec-
tively negative effect); perceived privacy risk is nega-
tively associated with intention to share data, with this 
association being moderated by need for cognition 
(positive effect) and institutional trust (negative ef-
fect). Table 2 shows our regression results. 
 
Table 2: Results from Multiple Moderation Re-
gression Analysis. 
 Dependent variables - B (SE HC3) 
Independent variables Perc. Privacy Risk Intention to Disclose 
Main effects 
Connected Car Threats 0.787 *** (0.047) 0.070  (0.075) 
Chr. Prevention Focus -0.142 *** (0.048) 0.057  (0.063) 
Perc. Privacy Risk    -0.654 *** (0.051) 
Institutional Trust    -0.050  (0.059) 
Need for Cognition    -0.156 ** (0.051) 
Interactions 
PR X Trust    0.063 ** (0.059) 
PR X Need for Cogn.    -0.163 *** (0.122) 
Control variables 
Reg. Access to Car -0.131  (0.156) 0.335 * (0.187) 
Low Mileage -0.010  (0.147) 0.053  (0.174) 
Private Car Usage -0.272 ** (0.131) 0.023  (0.177) 
Car Sharing Usage 0.150  (1.177) -0.037  (0.907) 
Business Usage 0.253  (0.126) -0.208  (0.173) 
Innovativeness -0.121 *** (0.046) 0.255 *** (0.060) 
Digital Experience 0.041  (0.067) -0.150 * (0.086) 
Smartphone Owner -0.803 * (0.415) 0.193  (0.896) 
Age 0.008 * (0.005) -0.001  (0.006) 
High School Degree 0.170  (0.155) 0.126  (0.190) 
Gender -0.087  (0.100) 0.312 ** (0.131) 
High Income 0.025  (0.146) -0.125  (0.193) 
Constant -2.183 *** (0.623) 2.258 ** (1.082) 
R-squared 0.292   0.324   
F-squared 0.412   0.479   
Notes. Total observations = 791. Unstandardized estimates from Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) models. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 
(HC3, [22]) in parentheses. Perceived Privacy Risk, Institutional Trust, and 
Need for Cognition were mean centered before creating the interaction 
terms. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
5. Conclusion and implications 
5.1. Implications for research 
The objective of this paper was to paint a nuanced 
picture of how individuals form privacy risk percep-
tions when deciding whether to share car data in ex-
change for a connected car service and how these per-
ceptions affect their data sharing decisions. We pre-
sented arguments and empirical evidence suggesting 
that individuals base their privacy risk perceptions on 
an assessment of two components: Perceptions of IS-
specific threats that might occur to users of the IS in 
general and their perceived level of personal exposure 
to such threats. This reflects the notion of likelihood 
and severity of negative consequences as determinants 
for risk perception that has been established across dif-
ferent contexts and disciplines. With the exact nega-
tive consequences and their likelihood being highly 
context-specific, we identify perceived connected car 
threats as a contextual antecedent increasing the level 
of perceived privacy risk. On the other hand, we find 
an individual's chronic prevention focus to decrease 
the level of perceived privacy risk, as individuals with 
a high tendency to comply to rules perceive a lower 
personal exposure to connected car-specific threats. 
Furthermore, our findings picture data sharing deci-
sions as cognitively complex processes: Individuals 
with a higher need for cognition consider their privacy 
risk perceptions more strongly in the privacy decision. 
A high institutional trust towards car manufacturers, 
on the other hand, reduces the effect of privacy risk 
perceptions on data sharing intentions. 
Our findings help retracing how exactly individu-
als, confronted with a distinctive privacy-invasive IS 
and its specifics, form privacy risk perceptions and 
how they consider these in the decision whether to 
share data. The findings pose several contextual, con-
ceptual and methodological implications. First, we re-
spond to the call for context-specific theorizing in IS 
research [24] and generated rich and relevant insights 
as well as applicable advice for practitioners. We con-
tribute to expanding the limits of privacy research 
through exploring one of the emerging IoT contexts. 
As privacy risks can even take the form of “life-threat-
ening” breaches affecting the whole society (Lowry et 
al. 2017), our work underlines the important role of 
physical and prosecution-related threats in privacy risk 
perceptions that distinguishes connected cars from es-
tablished contexts for privacy research like direct mar-




28]. This way, connected cars blur the lines between 
the commonly distinctive concepts of information and 
physical privacy [38]. Research in other IoT contexts 
such as smart home should further investigate this con-
vergence. Second, we make several contributions to 
extant conceptual models of data sharing decisions. 
Our study addressed the critique of prevalent concep-
tualizations of privacy risk being abstract and unidi-
mensional [26], by identifying the specific threats 
caused by the privacy-invasive practices of connected 
cars. Incorporating IS-specific negative consequences 
as an antecedent of privacy risk perceptions rather than 
as scale of perceived privacy risk itself thereby re-
mains connectivity to extant research and comparabil-
ity across IS contexts. Decomposing privacy risk per-
ceptions into an assessment of likelihood and severity 
of negative consequences helps dismantling the am-
biguous and vague use of conceptualizations of pri-
vacy risks [20]. It further enhances the compatibility 
of privacy research to other areas investigating risk 
perceptions in consumer behavior, as the notion of 
likelihood and severity dimension, although well es-
tablished in research on risks, has not been followed 
consistently by extant research on privacy risks. Our 
study is a case in point that research should conceptu-
alize privacy risk perceptions as an outcome of dedi-
cated, IS-specific threats and an individual's subjective 
level of exposure to these risks, rather than considering 
privacy risks as fears of vague disadvantages. Further, 
our findings substantiate the work on regulatory focus, 
thinking style, and institutional trust in privacy litera-
ture and provide guidance for further use of these con-
cepts in contextualized research. While extant research 
[6] has focused on situational prevention focus as a 
moderator of privacy risk perceptions, we conceptual-
ize chronic prevention focus as an adequate proxy for 
general compliance to rules and norms, reflecting an 
individual's personal exposure to negative conse-
quences of privacy-invasive practices. While prior re-
search [27] considers need for cognition a factor in-
creasing situational privacy risk perceptions per se, we 
find support for the moderating role of need for cogni-
tion, increasing the effect of privacy risk perceptions. 
On the other side, our evidence suggests institutional 
trust as a moderator that attenuates the effect of pri-
vacy risk perceptions. In novel IoT contexts such as 
connected cars, we advocate to implement institutional 
trust as a moderator of privacy risk perceptions, as in-
dividuals are unlikely to have relational experience 
with specific service providers' trustworthiness. More 
fundamentally, our investigation of institutional trust 
and need for cognition contributes to the growing cri-
tique of the privacy calculus and its core assumption 
of individuals as rational agents [2]. Our study adds to 
the increasing stream of literature that integrates as-
pects from behavioral economics better explain para-
doxical behaviors in privacy decisions [1]. Third, in 
terms of methodological contributions, our pre-study 
confirmed the dimensions of privacy risk put forward 
[26] in another IoT context and validated an exhaus-
tive set of perceived connected car threats from extant 
literature [8] in a realistic connected car setting, 
providing respondents with a live demonstration rather 
than a hypothetical scenario. By doing so, we created 
a robust measure that is readily available for further 
studies investigating the highly relevant connected car 
context and that can also inspire measures for per-
ceived threats in other IS contexts 
5.2. Implications for practice and policy 
Our research responds to calls to address issues in 
privacy that are unresolved and controversial in prac-
tice rather than spotting gaps in prior literature [29, 
35]. Privacy risk perceptions are a decision-making 
factor for customers that service providers can actively 
alter. The perceived connected car threats outlined in 
our study serve as actionable advice, which dimen-
sions to address to reduce customers' hesitance to-
wards sharing car data. Our findings point at the high 
prevalence of concerns regarding negative conse-
quences for one's physical safety , for instance, 
through criminals identifying daily routines and 
hacker attacks. Also, individuals are frequently con-
cerned of disadvantages through secondary use of 
data, revealing their traffic offences and improper han-
dling of the vehicle. Car manufacturers could mitigate 
these risk perceptions, if they establish and communi-
cate privacy policies that, for instance, explicitly ex-
clude provision of data to prosecution authorities. 
Notably, not all the risk perceptions that individ-
uals may have are fully reasonable, as measures like 
legal safeguards and cybersecurity measures may re-
duce the probability of certain consequences to a min-
imum. For practitioners, it may be especially insightful 
to review the delta between perceived privacy risk of 
users and the actual privacy risks […] to learn which 
risks are overestimated and which are underestimated 
by users. Correspondingly, we show that policies play 
a key role in customers’ acceptance of connected car 
services – not only those directly affecting connected 
car services by regulating their privacy-invasive prac-
tices, but also those that create the broader regulations 
around using cars in general. 
6. Limitations and future research 
Our study is subject to several limitations. Alt-




scenario in our survey rather than measuring actual us-
age behavior is a limitation of our study. We partly ad-
dressed this in our pre-study by using a realistic con-
nected car setting with live demonstration rather than 
a purely hypothetical scenario. We also point out that 
our sample is not representative of the population in 
terms of age and education level. A further constraint 
of our study lies in the geographic context of Germany. 
As privacy norms and risk perceptions deviate across 
different geographies and cultural dimensions might 
interplay with regulatory focus [6], we explicitly en-
courage researchers to conduct replication studies in 
other countries. Compatibility to investigation of per-
ceived risk in other domains could be increased, if the 
component of personal severity of the perceived con-
sequences [15] is more deeply embedded in the con-
struct conceptualization. 
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Appendix: Construct Measures 
A) Perceived Privacy Risk* (adapted from [14]; CA = 0.87; CR = 0.87, 
AVE = 0.63) 
B) Chronic Prevention Focus* (adapted from [21]; CA = 
0.68; CR = 0.80; AVE = 0.53) 
C) Institutional Trust* (adapted from [37]; CA = 0.88; CR = 0.88; AVE= 
0.72) 
D) Need for Cognition* (adapted from [16]; CA = 0.77; 
CR = 0.84; AVE = 0.57) 
E) Perceived Connected Car Threats** (self-developed) How do you assess the likelihood of occurrence of the following scenarios? 
[Psychological risks] 
1. Drivers increasingly feel surveilled and fully transparent. 
2. Drivers feel overwhelmed by complexity of data and information flows 
of connected cars. 
[Career-related risks] 
3. Professional drivers face disadvantages when applying for or performing 
driving jobs (e.g., when excessive breaks or traffic offences can be 
proven). 
[Prosecution-related risks] 
4. Police uses driving data to impose prosecution, fines, or loss of driving 
license in the event of recorded misbehavior. 
5. Data of connected cars is used to identify streets with frequent speeding 
and, in turn, to optimize positioning of radar speed checks. 
[Financial risks] 
6. Connected car owners lose warranty services for the vehicle (e.g., when 
improper handling is recorded). 
7. Drivers see disadvantages when insuring or renting a car (e.g., for risky 
driving style) and face liability issues in case of self-inflicted car acci-
dent. 
8. Car manufacturer performs digital manipulations to stimulate spending 
on car maintenance and repair. 
[Physical risks] 
9. Criminals use driving data to identify daily routines and 
vulnerabilities (e.g., burglars might find out when no 
one is at home or know that car is usually not locked 
when parked in one’s private garage). 
10. Hackers manipulate vehicle functions (e.g., window 
lifts, breaks). 
[Social risks] 
11. Drivers are stigmatized as bad drivers. 
12. Data is assigned to the wrong driver and incorrect infer-
ences from driving data are drawn (e.g., in case of a 
company car or when car is shared among family mem-
bers). 
[Freedom-related risks] 
13. Car manufacturer (mis)use shared driving data for un-
expected purposes or resale the data to other compa-
nies.  
14. Increase of unsolicited advertisement and rebate offer-
ings by car manufacturers. 
15. Criminals steal or manipulate driving data (e.g., 
through data leaks, hacker attacks). 
Notes. All items measured by seven-point scales. *Anchored by “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”; **anchored by “unrealistic” and “realistic”. CA = 
Cronbach’s alpha; CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted. For our novel construct Perceived Connected Car Threats which we specified as 
an index with formative indicators, common measures for validity and internal consistency are not appropriate [11]. We however found confidence in the adequate 
validity through bottom-up construction based on our interviews and through comparison to extant studies [8, 26]. A detailed appendix on the construct develop-
ment process can be provided by the authors upon request. 
 
Page 4423
